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Arms Control, Proliferation and Terrorism: The Bush Administration's Post-September 11 Security Strategy

ANDREW NEWMAN

The current Bush Administration considers 'outlaw regimes' and their terrorist clients acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the gravest danger to international security. Thus, arms control, proliferation and terrorism are inextricably linked. The administration also believes that arms control and non-proliferation, as traditionally practiced, do not provide effective tools for preventing WMD spread. As evidenced in Iraq, Washington subscribes to an interventionist policy of rolling back WMD programs it considers threatening. This article examines the logic that underpins US arms control and proliferation thinking and considers the implications of US policy for relations with other states deemed to be proliferation risks.

In 2002, senior policy analyst at Science Applications International Corporation Jeffrey Larsen ruminated that arms control seemed to be losing its lustre.¹ Arms control, at least as it has traditionally been understood, is increasingly seen by official Washington as ponderous at best and counter-productive at worst. George W. Bush and his national security team have embraced 'a new way of doing business in the strategic nuclear realm',² have taken a decidedly ambivalent approach to several mainstays of the arms control regime and have placed greater emphasis on the prevention and pre-emption of emerging nuclear, chemical and biological programs in 'rogue regimes' by military means.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks re-invigorated US counter-terrorism policy.³ They also have a mutually constitutive relationship with arms control and proliferation policies. Administration officials, from President Bush down, have made explicit links between proliferation and the 'war on terror'. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith explained that when the September 11, attack occurred, containment and deterrence of Iraq had to be re-thought given that the dangers posed by Iraq 'really existed in aggravated form when you considered the possibility that Saddam Hussein could use his linkages with terrorist organizations to launch attacks with his chemical or biological weapons or eventually with a nuclear weapon ... to defeat any kind of deterrent policy'.⁴

President Bush made the link between proliferation and terrorism in his 2002 State of the Union Address, declaring that states like North Korea, Iran and Iraq, and their terrorist allies, are 'seeking weapons of mass destruction ... They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.'⁵ John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and International Security, made the same point in November 2002. He argued that terrorist groups are seeking to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and state sponsors of terrorism are actively working to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems. 'Here lies a dangerous confluence of nefarious motives, and we must prevent the one from abetting the other.'⁶

The relationship described above between the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and terrorism, in turn, affects US arms control policy. In 2001, Bolton described the relationship between arms control and proliferation as follows:

Arms control can be an important part of American foreign policy, but I think the real question is what advances our national interest. And in those cases where, for example, arms control treaties are ineffective or counterproductive or obsolete, they shouldn't be allowed to stand in the way of the development of our foreign policy ... We know that there are a lot of states that have made commitments under existing arms control agreements that they're not following ... And it's one of the reasons why the idea of counter-proliferation – not just nonproliferation, but counter-proliferation – is something we have to take seriously.⁷

Senator Richard Lugar succinctly described how all three (arms control, proliferation and terrorism) relate to each other in the new strategic environment:

By proposing that the next phase of the war on terrorism focus on weapons of mass destruction, and by forming a coalition to combat it, Presidents Bush and Putin would be addressing arguably the most important problem in international security today. Such a coalition could provide both Presidents with a focus for the qualitatively new post-Cold War relationship they have propounded but to which they have yet to give major content. It would be a fitting replacement for the old-style bilateral arms control regimes whose era is drawing to an end.⁸

Bush revealed in his 2003 State of the Union address that US policies to address these new security threats rely heavily on multilateral approaches: supporting IAEA efforts to track and control nuclear materials, working with other governments to secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union and strengthening global treaties banning the production and shipment of missile technologies and WMD.⁹ However, the Administration's interpretation of multilateralism conforms to a greater degree with narrow calculations of American national interest than such platitudes suggest.

This article analyses the US arms control and non-proliferation record in an effort, first, to identify some of the key drivers of arms control and proliferation decision-making in the Bush Administration and, second, uses the preceding analysis to explain the practice of US arms control and proliferation policy post-September 11. In conclusion, some suggestions are proffered regarding the implications of the Bush Administration's security doctrine for US relations with North Korea, Iran and beyond. It will be argued that the Bush Administration has very little faith in, or patience for, the ability of traditional arms control and nonproliferation approaches to regulate the behavior of states determined to use these regimes as a cover to pursue proscribed activities. However, using military force to 'roll back' WMD programs, as occurred in Iraq, may in fact encourage as much as retard the development of such weapons. The lessons that are drawn from the 2003 Iraq conflict will be critical to the future of the nonproliferation regime; both in Washington and in Tehran, Pyongyang and Damascus.

By way of introduction, a brief overview of unclassified US intelligence assessments of the nuclear, chemical and biological programs of the key proliferation-risk states – Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Sudan, India and Pakistan – will be proffered in order to provide an understanding of the threats that concern the US government. Following this, the attitudes of President Bush's key arms control and non-proliferation advisors to their bureaucratic missions – drawing extensively on public statements by these officials – are surveyed in order to provide an intellectual grounding for an examination of four of the government's key security policies.

Proliferation Threats

This section describes the nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs of the key proliferation-risk states, as determined by the CIA.¹⁰ Table I lists proliferation-risk states and the status of their suspected WMD programs.

TABLE 1
WMD PROLIFERATORS

Iran	
Nuclear	‘Vigorously’ pursuing programs to produce indigenous nuclear weapons as well as delivery systems; attempted to use its civilian nuclear energy program to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities suited to fissile material production for a weapons program; interested in acquiring foreign fissile material and technology for weapons program.
● Chemical	Seeks chemicals, technology, training and expertise to produce nerve agents; stockpiled blister, blood and choking agents as well as delivery vehicles for these.
● Biological	Procures dual-use bio-technical materials, equipment and expertise which could benefit biological warfare program.
● Missile	Producing short-range ballistic missiles and in various stages of development of medium and longer-range (including space-launch capability) ballistic missiles.
Iraq¹¹	
Nuclear	Following the 1999 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein’s repeated exhortations to his ‘Nuclear Mujahidin’ to ‘defeat the enemy’ suggested continued research and development work on a nuclear program; ¹² efforts to procure tens of thousands of high-strength aluminium tubes as well as magnets, a magnet production plant and high-speed balancing machines suggest end-use in a centrifuge enrichment program; ¹³ retained a cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians, program documentation and sufficient dual-use capabilities to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program.
● Chemical	Expanded, under cover of civilian industries and dual-use infrastructure, chemical weapons production capability; accounting and production capabilities suggested stockpile of between 100 and 500 metric tons of VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard agents.
● Biological	Admitted in 1995 to the production and weaponization thousands of litres of anthrax, ¹⁴ botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin; improvement/ expansion of nominally ‘civilian’ facilities suggest key aspects of the weapons program are active and most elements are more advanced and larger than before the 1991 Gulf War, including the development of mobile production units and laboratories; ¹⁵ has investigated gas gangrene, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camel pox, hemorrhagic fever and has ‘wherewithal’ to develop small pox. ¹⁶
● Missile	Developed unmanned aerial vehicles to disperse chem/bio agents (modified Mirages to spray bio agents) ¹⁷ never fully accounted for existing missile programs with ranges up to 650 km and developmental missile programs with intended ranges up to 3,000 km, retained a small force of extended range Scud B missiles and associated launchers/ warheads; did not account for components such as guidance and control systems that could not be produced indigenously; continued to develop the al-Samoud ¹⁸ and Al Fatah ballistic missiles capable of flying beyond 150 km; rebuilt and expanded missile development infrastructure.
North Korea	
● Nuclear	Continues to conduct a weapons program, commenced in 1995, based on uranium enrichment, ¹⁹ restarted the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and is suspected of reprocessing some spent fuel; ²⁰ estimated that ‘one, possibly two’ plutonium-based weapons have been produced. ²¹

(continued)

- Chemical Long-standing weapons program; capable of producing bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood agents, possesses a sizable stockpile of these – can be delivered by ballistic missile, artillery, aircraft and unconventional means; North Korean forces train regularly in chemical defense operations.²²
- Biological Pursued a capability since the 1960s; possesses rudimentary biotechnical infrastructure that could support agents/toxins such as anthrax, cholera and plague; believed to possess munitions-production infrastructure for weaponization and may have weapons available for use.²³
- Missile Has hundreds of Scud and 1,300 km-range No Dong missiles and continues to develop the Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile with a 10,000 km range.²⁴

Libya

- Nuclear Developed nuclear infrastructure through civil-sector work, obtained dual-use technologies and WMD technical information by its secret services.
- Chemical Worked toward offensive chemical weapons capabilities.
- Biological Worked toward offensive biological weapons capabilities.
- Missile Ballistic missile capability remained limited to Scud Bs but with foreign assistance would probably have achieved a medium range or extended-range Scud capability.

Syria

- Nuclear Cooperation with foreign sources on civil nuclear power provide opportunities to expand indigenous capabilities should it decide to pursue a weapons program.
- Chemical Stockpiles sarin but is apparently trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents.
- Biological Development of a biological weapons program is highly probable.
- Missile Continues to receive foreign assistance on solid-fuel rocket motors, relies on foreign equipment/assistance for liquid-fuel missile program and continues efforts to assemble Scud C missiles.

Sudan

- Nuclear –
- Chemical Has been developing chemical weapons production capability for many years with foreign (principally Iraqi) assistance.
- Biological May be interested in a biological weapons program.
- Missile May seek a ballistic missile capability in the future.

India

- Nuclear May 1998 nuclear tests were a significant milestone; continues efforts to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons; continues to obtain foreign assistance for civilian nuclear power program.²⁵
- Chemical Publicly acknowledged chemical warfare program in June 1997; has made a commitment to destroy chemical weapons although its chemical industry is capable of producing a wide variety of precursors should the government change policy.²⁶
- Biological Has many well-qualified scientists, numerous biological and pharmaceutical production facilities and biocontainment facilities suitable for biological weapons research and development.

(continued)

- **Missile** Relies on foreign assistance for engineering/ production expertise in key missile technologies; possesses an indigenous space program; deployed only the 150 km range Prithvi I short range ballistic missile, has modified this missile (Prithvi II) to extend range to 250 km, is developing the Agni series of intermediate range missiles with ranges of 2,500 to 3,500 km and the Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile;²⁷ continues to develop two variants of the Dhanush ship-launched missile with ranges of 250 to 500 km²⁸ and the Brahmos cruise missile.

Pakistan

- **Nuclear** May 1998 nuclear tests demonstrated its well developed program; continues to acquire nuclear-related and dual-use equipment which will be important should it choose to develop more advanced nuclear weapons.²⁹
 - **Chemical** Has imported dual-use chemicals; is establishing a viable commercial chemical industry and could deliver weaponized agents by missile, artillery and aerial bomb.
 - **Biological** Has the resources/capabilities to support a limited biological warfare effort, may continue to seek equipment/technology to expand its biotechnical infrastructure.³⁰
 - **Missile** Is moving toward serial production of the 800 km range Shaheen-I and Haider-I short range ballistic missiles, has developed the 2,000km range Shaheen-II medium range ballistic missile.³¹
-

The Bush Administration and US Security: The Policy Framework

Like his father, George W. Bush assembled a high-powered national security team. Many of the cabinet-level advisers held their most senior posts in moderate Republican administrations rather than during the more conservative and ideological Reagan years. For example, Vice President Dick Cheney, while chairman of the Republican Policy Committee from 1981 to 1987, was Gerald Ford's Chief of Staff and George H.W. Bush's Defense Secretary. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, while a member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and the President's Envoy to the Middle East during the Reagan years, served as Richard Nixon's Counsellor then Ambassador to NATO and Ford's Chief of Staff then Secretary of Defense. While National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice served as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 1986, from 1989 to 1991 she was director, then senior director, of Soviet and East European Affairs in the NSC as well as a Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs. And while Paul Wolfowitz served as Reagan's Director of Policy Planning at State from 1981 to 1982 and as an Assistant Secretary of State, he held various posts during the 1970s, including four years with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (where he participated in the 'Team B' competitive analysis of the CIA's estimates of Soviet intentions and capabilities, discussed below)³² and even as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Carter Administration. Wolfowitz also served George H.W. Bush as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

This is not to suggest that Reaganites do not occupy positions of power in the bureaucracy. For example, Democrat Richard Perle, who on 27 March 2003 resigned as chairman of the Defense Policy Board but remains a member of that committee,³³ was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from 1981 to 1987. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman served as Director of Policy Planning at State from 1984 to 1986 and Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs during 1986–87. And Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs from 1981 to 1983 and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1983 to 1989.

However, particularly since September 11, the Administration's rhetoric – already distinguished by the straight-talking of men like Bush and Rumsfeld³⁴ – has become increasingly Reaganesque and its government appointments resemble, in key areas, those of the Reagan Administration: people whom, in the words of Strobe Talbott, 'differed in many important ways from their predecessors – in their world outlook, their view of America's adversaries ... their conception of their own opportunities and obligations'.³⁵ The Reaganesque, or neo-conservative, agenda has been significantly strengthened by events in Iraq. In addition, the sidelining of the United Nations has dealt the 'moderate internationalist'³⁶ faction within the Administration, principally Colin Powell, a potentially fatal blow given the political capital Powell expended working through the Security Council.³⁷ The ability to effect decisive regime change in Baghdad, if this does in fact prove to be the case, is also likely to vindicate the neo-conservative strategy at the expense of less interventionist approaches.

The Administration took office with some clear ideas about how security policy should be made. An anonymous Bush foreign policy adviser remarked early in 2001: 'The Clinton people got intoxicated with the idea of cooperation. Those days are over. It's time for us to cooperate when we can but to put our strategic interests first. No more romance.'³⁸ The views of some of Bush's key staffers regarding the utility of nuclear weapons to US security provide a useful starting point for examining the relationship between arms control, proliferation and terrorism as conceived by the current Republican team.

In 1995 then-UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed the sense of the United Nations that the NPT's 'call for "general and complete disarmament"' is an essential provision', suggesting that the de-legitimization of nuclear weapons is central to the Treaty in particular and the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general.³⁹ In contrast, America's possession of nuclear weapons is a lynchpin of US security according to the Bush team. Although this is hardly a novel concept in American strategic thought, the

fusion of current arms control, proliferation and terrorism policies with declared national security doctrine lays the foundation for far more aggressive and interventionist international conduct than in the past. Robert Joseph, currently Senior Director for Non-Proliferation Strategies, Counter-Proliferation and Homeland Defense in the NSC, declared in 1999 that it was essential that the US acquire the capabilities – including active/passive defenses and improved counterforce means – to deny an enemy the benefits of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These capabilities would strengthen deterrence and provide the best hedge against deterrence failure:

[C]onventional superiority alone cannot provide for a credible deterrent. In fact, despite sustained and determined efforts by some to de-legitimize our nuclear weapons and assertions that their utility ended with the Cold War ... we have concluded that our nuclear weapons are the single most important instrument we have for deterring NBC use against us by rogue states.⁴⁰

According to Under Secretary of State John Bolton, the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the utility of the nuclear weapons as a deterrent to chemical and biological weapons use by 'rogue states'. Bolton argued that the George H. W. Bush administration had made the decision not to retaliate with nuclear weapons should Iraq employ chemical or biological weapons in the conflict but chose not to furnish then-Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz with that information. Rather, a policy of deliberate ambiguity was pursued, in order 'to let him worry about what the consequences might be. And I think there was a good reason to take that approach then. I think it's a good reason to leave it like that now.'⁴¹

Stephen Cambone, currently Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, articulated a broad architecture for arms control in 2000 when he stated that 'the rationales developed to guide Cold War arms-control efforts are not so easily adapted to the evolving post-Cold War strategic environment'.⁴² Deterrence is not limited to nuclear, chemical or biological attacks on the United States thus deterrence cannot be easily enforced in the emerging environment through strategic offensive and missile defense forces. It also requires enhanced intelligence as well as conventional forces coupled to diplomatic initiatives to dampen incipient threats, reduce existing threats and encourage collective action in response to aggression. 'There can be a place for arms control in such a strategy; the challenge is to find it.'⁴³

In describing the Administration's approach to strategic nuclear weapons reductions, Under Secretary Douglas Feith was a little more specific than Cambone: 'We are not thinking of what we're doing as an exercise in arms control.' Cold War-style arms control institutionalizes the hostile US–Soviet

relationship. 'And we're not looking to get echoes of that, and we're not looking to recreate arms control-style negotiations or agreements.'⁴⁴ The Under Secretary continued that there is an arms control and strategic stability 'priesthood' and it is difficult for this group, after investing decades of intellectual and emotional energy in such strategic concepts, to abandon them and think in new ways. 'But the world has changed . . . And if there was much of a debate . . . there shouldn't be much now, since September 11th.'⁴⁵

One of the most extensive treatments of the relationship between nuclear weapons and arms control was released by the National Institute for Public Policy in January 2001. The significance of the report's recommendations was underlined by the fact that three of the authors took up senior positions in the National Security Council (Stephen Hadley and Robert Joseph) and the Defense Department (Stephen Cambone) with responsibility for formulating and implementing policy in the areas the report examined. Unsurprisingly, it bears a striking resemblance to the Nuclear Posture Review (discussed below) released on 31 December 2001.

The report identified five possible roles for nuclear weapons:

1. deterring WMD use by regional powers;
2. deterring WMD or conventional aggression by an emerging global competitor;
3. enhancing US influence in crises;
4. preventing catastrophic losses in conventional war; and
5. providing unique targeting capabilities, such as deep underground and biological weapons targets.⁴⁶

The report stressed that these five roles are just as important as non-proliferation, international norms and operational safety goals. Deciding which considerations receive priority will be determined by how benign or threatening the security environment is. Given the 'dizzying pace of change in the international system' and the 'current pace of proliferation', 'predictions about the future level of WMD threat to the United States [must be] highly speculative'.⁴⁷ Uncertainty is the driver of both nuclear sufficiency and arms control. The authors recommend that arms control policy be held to the same standard as defense policy – 'how well can it adjust to changing conditions?' By this measure, Cold War arms control, with its requirement for formal treaties, codified ceilings and detailed verification regimes, fails. This is because liberal democracies have great difficulty withdrawing from, or even revising, agreements if the threat context changes, as evidenced by the 'political and technical contortions to which the U.S. has gone to comply with, and seek relief from, the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty'.⁴⁸ Traditional, bilateral arms control is outmoded and counter-

productive. Indeed, 'Moscow's response to a US initiative to restructure the arms control process would be *one factor, among many*, that would shape the subsequent direction of the US nuclear force structure'.⁴⁹

This is why the US nuclear force must be adaptable – to allow for both reductions and increases. While the authors concede that 'a comprehensive strategic review may well indicate that deep US nuclear reductions are a prudent option for Washington today', the danger is committing to a rigid, formal arms control approach that precludes restructuring in either direction. Given that the report quotes approvingly a 1977 RAND report counselling that the United States 'is likely to desire the capability to deter authoritarian adversaries who are impressed by an opposing nuclear force with greater, rather than fewer weapons',⁵⁰ the authors are clearly in favor of a robust nuclear posture with a great deal of freedom to manoeuvre. As discussed below, this is precisely what the 2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions has delivered.

Many of the NIPP report's recommendations were presaged by a series of seminars, sponsored and fashioned into a report by The Project for the New American Century in September 2000. These analogous points included:

- opposition to the CTBT;
- arms control and nuclear weapons planning/force structure to take account of not just Russia but also smaller arsenals, such as China, North Korea, Pakistan and perhaps Iraq and Iran;
- arms control and nuclear weapons planning/force structure to take account of the possible need to deter chemical and biological weapons threats;
- the need for new nuclear weapons to target deep underground, hardened bunkers;
- the need to maintain nuclear superiority; and
- the need to develop a system of global missile defenses.⁵¹

Like the NIPP membership, the report's participant list included current senior government officials, including Paul Wolfowitz, Stephen Cambone, I. Lewis Libby and Dov Zakheim (Defense Comptroller).⁵²

The most important official indicator of the Administration's thinking on nuclear weapons was conveyed in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), carried out by the Department of Defense (DoD) in close cooperation with the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration and submitted to Congress (but not made public) on 31 December 2001. According to then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy J.D. Crouch, the contextual underpinning for the Congressionally-mandated review was twofold: transforming the military to meet twenty-first

century security challenges, in particular multiple and as yet undefined opponents, and a completely new relationship with Russia.

The former weighed more heavily in the minds of the authors. The NPR emphasized the critical role nuclear weapons play in deterring WMD and large conventional military forces as well holding at risk target classes such as deep underground bunkers and bio-weapon facilities if deterrence fails⁵³ – objectives that are reminiscent of the US declaratory nuclear policies of *flexible response* and *limited nuclear options* during the 1960s and the 1970s. The review conceded that nuclear weapons alone were not suitable for many of the threats facing the US and thus proposed a ‘new triad’ composed of nuclear and non-nuclear offensive systems, active and passive defenses and a revitalized defense infrastructure to respond to ‘large strategic changes’.⁵⁴ In order to achieve this, the NPR stressed a capabilities-base approach rather than a threat-based approach to planning and emphasized flexibility, that is, the ability to augment both offensive and defensive systems through the maintenance of a ‘responsive force’ or ‘strategic stockpile’.⁵⁵

More provocatively, the NPR listed seven countries that are incorporated into US contingency planning, which determines nuclear strike capabilities: North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, China and Russia. The review also presaged force modernization projects designed to enhance counter-proliferation policy, such as improved earth-penetrating weapons, warheads that reduce collateral damage and ‘agent defeat’ weapons to counter chemical and biological weapons.⁵⁶

While there is much continuity between the 2001 NPR and the policies pursued by George W. Bush’s predecessors, the pursuit of maximum flexibility prompted the Administration to shelve two major arms control agreements. It renounced the ABMT to remove limits on the development of missile defenses and opposed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a centrepiece of the Clinton Administration’s nuclear agenda. Though the administration adhered to the nuclear testing moratorium, it proposed to reduce the time required to prepare for renewed testing from a two-to-three-year period to less than one.⁵⁷

The Bush national security team is sceptical of traditional, Cold War deterrence functioning as an effective strategic concept, given the threat facing the United States today; terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction or their precursors.⁵⁸ Much of the logic that underpins the concern with WMD terrorism can be distilled from earlier threat analysis carried out by senior Administration officials. One of the most prescient studies of WMD proliferation was contained in the 1998 *Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*, chaired by Donald

Rumsfeld, and its findings expound a concise rationale for current US WMD terrorism policy.⁵⁹ In terms of this paper, the Commission, which included Paul Wolfowitz and Stephen Cambone, drew three key conclusions. First, intelligence cannot provide a totally reliable picture of the proliferation problem in target states – ‘the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence’ – and that America should ‘be arranged to deal with the risks that the inevitable surprises will pose’.⁶⁰ Second, these countries do not require the same *quality control* as the United States. They are ‘less concerned about safety and [are] able to meet their needs with only a few, less accurate, less reliable weapons’. This enables the utilization of ‘primitive’ technologies (such as the Iraqi decision to separate uranium with calutrons), often negates the need for testing and does not require an extended weapons development phase. Third, countries of proliferation concern are ‘helping each other’. Whether for strategic or financial reasons, technology transfer is ‘pervasive’. Combined with more sophisticated deception techniques, this serves to help keep programs secret and accelerates the pace of program development.

The approaches to nuclear weapons, proliferation, arms control and deterrence outlined above form the basis for the Bush Administration’s security thinking. The following section examines how this approach has impacted on policy-making.

The Bush Administration and US Security Policy: Four Key Issues

The Bush Administration released three national strategy papers from September 2002 to February 2003, providing a public articulation of US security policy post-September 11. All three stress the inherent link between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

The *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* advises: ‘Some states, including several that have supported and continue to support terrorism, already possess WMD and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation. For them, these are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice . . . In addition, terrorist groups are seeking to acquire WMD with the stated purpose of killing large numbers of our people and those of friends and allies.’⁶¹

The *National Security Strategy* warns: Iraq, Iran, North Korea and other rogue regimes are ‘determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes’.⁶²

Finally, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* declares:

The availability of critical technologies, and the willingness of some scientists and others to cooperate with terrorists, and the ease of

intercontinental transportation enable terrorist organizations to more easily acquire, manufacture, deploy, and initiate a WMD attack either on US soil or abroad . . . Now, with a WMD capability, they have the potential to magnify the effects of their actions many fold.⁶³

The ideological convictions of Administration officials outlined previously and the broad guidance provided in the national strategy papers described above have played a large role in shaping US arms control and nonproliferation policy. Four examples are provided below.

Strategic Nuclear Arms and Ballistic Missile Defense

On 24 May 2002, the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) was signed in Moscow. It consisted of 'just five articles and 485 words, barely two pages long, with no annexes or protocols, as opposed to the 47 pages and 19 articles of START, with its hundreds of pages of annexes and protocols'.⁶⁴ SORT limits the United States and Russia to an aggregate number of warheads not exceeding 1,700–2,200 by 31 December 2012 and allows each party to determine the composition of its force structure.⁶⁵ Significantly, there are no requirements for the withdrawn warheads to be dismantled, providing precisely what the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review instructed and the 2001 National Institute for Public Policy report counselled: the preservation of maximum nuclear flexibility.⁶⁶ However, it also has the potential to undercut one of the Administration's 'three pillars' to combat weapons of mass destruction: preventing the proliferation of Soviet-legacy WMD. Storage and disposal of nuclear material is problematic, whether in the short term as intact warheads or in the longer term as fissile material components at the Mayak storage facility.⁶⁷ By increasing both the number of warheads to be put in storage and the amount of fissile material from dismantled warheads to be stored at Mayak, the Moscow Treaty exacerbates the already significant stresses on Russian storage capabilities and, as a consequence, harms Moscow's ability to prevent nuclear materials leakage. Ironically, Russia initially resisted US requests for flexibility in the ultimate disposition of SORT-withdrawn warheads, calling instead for warhead elimination.⁶⁸

The Moscow Treaty was also distinguished by its non-inclusion of verification provisions. While utilizing the 1991 START verification regime, SORT endeavored to build a 'qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations'.⁶⁹ Thus, rather than spending years negotiating complicated and specific ceilings, sub-ceilings and verification procedures – which implies a relationship based on distrust and mutual vulnerability – SORT incorporates flexibility into reductions and reflects a relationship based on 'common

responsibilities and interests'. US–Russian strategic nuclear arms dialogue has focused on transparency and information-sharing rather than the more formal and adversarial talks of the Cold War.⁷⁰

The same logic of flexibility and moving beyond an adversarial relationship with Russia underpins the Administration's announcement, on 13 December 2001, to withdraw from the ABMT and its pursuit of ballistic missile defenses to protect against weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means wielded by terrorists and rogue states.⁷¹ President Bush expressed his desire to move beyond the ABMT to a new framework, reflecting a clean break from the past, as well as his hope that the United States and Russia could eventually cooperate in a joint defense.⁷²

ABMT withdrawal has also been viewed as good domestic politics, as distinct from the Clinton Administration's 'uneasy' relationship with Congress. Evidence of the latter was the legislative branch's rejection of the CTBT and insistence, over the Administration's objections, that agreements with Russia to demarcate theatre missile defense systems from ABM systems be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.⁷³ However, this argument should only be taken so far given a Republican White House and Republican control of both Houses of Congress combined with a critical mass of support for missile defense within the executive and on Capitol Hill.

Threat Reduction

Established at the end of 1991 by Congress as the Soviet Union fractured into 15 constituent republics, US threat reduction programs assist former Soviet states to destroy WMD, improve security over WMD and fissile material and provide alternative employment for displaced WMD scientists and engineers. The Bush Administration has publicly stressed the importance it places on preventing nuclear leakage from the former Soviet Union in the proliferation fight. 'It's axiomatic that one can't build a nuclear weapon without fissile material. Thus a key part of our nonproliferation efforts relates to securing the hundreds of tons of such materials present mainly in Russia and the Former Soviet Union.'⁷⁴

In addition, the Administration also inherited a major review of the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs in Russia. Chaired by former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, the report concluded that while the most urgent national security threat to the United States was the danger that WMD or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nations for use against the United States, funding for nonproliferation programs fell short of what was required to adequately address the this danger. Therefore, it recommended the formulation of a strategic plan to

secure/neutralize all nuclear weapons-usable material in Russia and to prevent the outflow from Russia of nuclear and other WMD expertise, at a cost of up to \$30 billion over eight to ten years.⁷⁵

Despite these harbingers, the executive displayed some initial reluctance to translate verbal support for *cooperative* threat reduction programs into fiscal support.⁷⁶ Indeed, there are still high-level calls for threat reduction to be made a top priority.⁷⁷

In March 2001, the White House commenced a review of its threat reduction programs in the FSU. Released in December 2001, the findings looked favorably on these programs.⁷⁸ Earlier, the Administration had proposed cutting nonproliferation programs by approximately \$100 million. This cut was subsequently restored by Congress and an additional \$135 million was added by Congress in the wake of September 11, for a total of \$1014.2 million for Fiscal Year (FY) 2002.⁷⁹ An examination of the Bush Administration's budget requests post-September 11 reveals an uneven commitment to threat reduction as a means of denying potential proliferators access to what Senator Joe Biden (Democrat-Delaware) has described as 'the candy store for terrorists'.⁸⁰

The FY 2003 budget request totalled \$956.9 million.⁸¹ This was \$57.3 million less than the FY 2002 appropriation, including supplemental, and can be broken down as follows:

- Department of Energy: \$419.7 million (\$2.1 million increase)
- Department of Defense: \$428.3 million (\$16.6 million increase)
- Department of State: \$108.9 million (\$76 million reduction)

The FY 2004 budget projects a modest increase in threat reduction funding of \$34.1 million based on a comparison with the FY 2003 appropriations:⁸²

- Department of Energy: \$459 million (\$39.3 million increase)
- Department of Defense: \$451 million (\$22.7 million increase)
- Department of State: \$81 million (\$27.9 million reduction)

Biological Weapons Convention

In 1995 an Ad Hoc Group was created by the state-parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and tasked to conclude a legal binding protocol to strengthen the BWC's verification measures. Ad Hoc Group chairman Ambassador Tibor Tóth issued a version of this protocol in March 2001, only to have it and any further negotiations rejected by the United States on 25 July 2001 at the Ad Hoc Group's 24th Session. Then, on 7 December 2001, during the Treaty's Fifth Review Conference the US went further, calling for the termination of the Ad Hoc Group's mandate.⁸³

United States' objections to the Verification Protocol were summarized by Under Secretary of State Bolton in 2001. First, the inspection provisions would potentially divulge US defenses to aspiring biological weapons proliferators. Second, the protocol would compromise export control programs designed to restrict the trade in dual-use items with a biological weapons capability. Third, the inspection provisions would pose unacceptable risks to propriety information from legitimate pharmaceutical concerns.⁸⁴ The United States has presented its own package of nine, politically binding, measures to strengthen the convention and combat the threat of bioterrorism but as of this writing, discussion of any strengthened verification measures in the Ad Hoc Group forum has been shelved at US insistence and the future of the Group is uncertain.⁸⁵

'Axis of Evil'

Another indicator of the Bush Administration's dissatisfaction with multilateral arms control and nonproliferation was the President's reference to North Korea, Iran and Iraq as an 'axis of evil'. Multilateral regimes have great difficulty discriminating between states who join in good faith and those that seek to violate such agreements under cover of legitimacy. According to Under Secretary of State John Bolton, the political logic underpinning the naming of names is to focus attention on non-compliance. 'If countries are willing to sign agreements and then lie about their performance, they're perfectly willing, it seems to me, to sign other agreements and lie about their performance under those.' The hope is that some states may conclude that it is too costly, politically and economically, to lie about their international behavior. 'In effect, they have the key to their political jail cell in their hand.'⁸⁶

The friction between multilateralism and effective nonproliferation policy was captured in an address by Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley in 2001. Hadley explained that the Administration 'strongly and actively support[s] *all* multilateral nonproliferation, arms control, and export control regimes *that are currently in force*.'⁸⁷ Yet, earlier in the same address he seemed to emasculate this declaration by observing that existing nonproliferation instruments failed to halt the WMD and ballistic missile programs of the hard cases; North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya. 'We will deal with each of these hard cases individually, using the full range of political, economic, diplomatic, and if necessary military instruments at our disposal.'⁸⁸

One of the major drawbacks of this strategy, however, is that it may prove counterproductive. The 'naming of names' sets a clear benchmark by which US credibility may be judged. A challenge by any of these states automatically becomes a test of US resolve. As the global 'sheriff' in the

proliferation fight,⁸⁹ if Washington is not willing to prevent proliferation by the application of armed force – particularly if the dangers of WMD retaliation are deemed to be too great – the nonproliferation regime will be undermined. Indeed, if these ‘outlaw states’ determine that functioning WMD programs deter US intervention, such inaction may well encourage further proliferation.

There is a clear sense of frustration with the nonproliferation regime and how it is presently being enforced. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Nonproliferation John Wolf was quite explicit in his assessment of the bleak prospects for multilateral nonproliferation efforts and the reasons why:

We face a world in change, and in the nonproliferation world, change is not for the better . . . While combating proliferation is, for us, a central, focusing national security issue, many others trade off concerns about the spread of WMD against economic and political interests . . . [W]hat’s missing in today’s international debate is a sense of outrage; international standards of acceptable conduct – embodied in treaties like the NPT and other nonproliferation treaties – are being violated by countries and the world is reluctant to impose consequences.⁹⁰

Frustration with multilateralism is not unique to the current Bush Administration or the Republicans. For example, there was not insignificant dissatisfaction within the Clinton Administration at the ‘political interference’ of NATO in the US-led military campaign in Kosovo.⁹¹ Similarly, Clinton officials expressed irritation with China and Russia, countries publicly committed to preventing proliferation but whose economic and security interests drove activities inconsistent with nonproliferation norms.⁹²

Beyond Iraq?

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz remarked on 11 March 2003:

Our successes in recent months in capturing terrorists demonstrate clearly that the effort we have mobilized at the same time to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass terror has not distracted us from the hunt for Al Qaeda. But make no mistake; these are not two separate issues. Disarming Saddam’s weapons of mass terror is a second front in the war on terrorism.⁹³

Will the US action in Iraq serve as a template for the aggressive roll-back of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs in countries it considers to present proliferation risks?⁹⁴ Certainly this link has been made both in and

out of government. Administration officials have argued that the disarming of Saddam Hussein will be watched with 'rapt attention' by 'Kim Jong Il and other budding violators'. Their willingness to develop weapons of mass destruction 'will be based on a careful calculation of the international community's likely reaction'.⁹⁵

Observing that President Bush has turned 'America's first new national security strategy in 50 years – the doctrine of pre-emptive military action against foes – into the rationale for America's latest war',⁹⁶ David Sanger extrapolated to ask whether Bush would take his doctrine to the next logical step: stopping countries that pose greater proliferation threats, namely North Korea and Iran? By way of response, he suggested that 'both countries pose potential threats to the United States at least as imminent as those posed by Iraq. And they are not only points on Mr. Bush's "axis of evil", they are in the sights of the more hawkish members of the Bush administration, who won the Iraq debate'.⁹⁷

As the preceding analysis suggests, the Administration is deeply dissatisfied with multilateral arms control and nonproliferation as currently practiced.⁹⁸ John Wolf observed that enhancing nonproliferation dialogue with worldwide partners is essential but dialogue 'is no substitute for concrete action, and where dialogue fails we will use other means – whether multilateral, plurilateral, or unilateral'.⁹⁹ In speeches to the annual conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, both Condoleezza Rice and John Bolton indicated that the two remaining 'axis of evil' members – North Korea and Iran – are firmly in the sights of the US government when the conflict in Iraq has been stabilized.¹⁰⁰ John Bolton was even more explicit in a Rome news conference, expressing his hope that Iran, Syria and North Korea would 'draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq that the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is not in their national interest'.¹⁰¹

Public pronouncements aside, there are important differences between the case of Iraq and Iran and North Korea. Despite the US decision not to put a further resolution (beyond 1441) to the UN Security Council on the use of force in Iraq, neither Iran or North Korea are under any international requirement to dismantle NBC weapons at present. Iraqi behavior triggered 17 UN Resolutions since 1991 directing it to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction. Irrespective of what one may think of the legality of the military disarmament of Iraq, the history of UN intent is noticeably lacking in both Iran and North Korea.

While Iran appears to be violating the spirit – if not the letter – of the NPT, it has not been demonstrated (yet?) that Tehran is in breach of its treaty obligations. However, its nuclear program is attracting international attention. After visiting Iran in February 2003 to inspect a gas centrifuge uranium-

enrichment facility at a complex at Natanz, the IAEA has began discussions with the Iranian authorities regarding 'a number of safeguards issues that need to be clarified, and actions that need to be taken'.¹⁰²

North Korea violated the 1994 Agreed Framework effectively before the ink had dried but it has withdrawn from the NPT. Article X provides the mechanism by which State Parties may withdraw, requiring three months notice. The DPRK's obligations were dispensed on 10 April 2003. According to US intelligence, North Korea has produced enough plutonium for one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. If Pyongyang is reprocessing spent fuel rods from the recently re-started nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, as is suspected, it is capable of producing enough material for a further five to eight nuclear weapons within a year.¹⁰³ On 12 February 2003, the IAEA reported its 'deep concern' with the DPRK's non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement and the Agency's inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material.¹⁰⁴

International support for the disarmament of Iran and North Korea has yet to be built. While a great deal of international condemnation did not stop the US leading an invasion of Iraq, making the case against these countries is still necessary both at the domestic and international level and this is a time consuming process. The 2004 Presidential election will also serve to re-direct attention as the Administration focuses on more traditional domestic issues, particularly the economy, in order to avoid the mistakes of 1992.

Conversely, time is not a commodity that the Administration possesses in great measure. The window of opportunity is closing. The diplomacy of engagement or coercive cooperation has only a limited time within which to yield results.¹⁰⁵ According to US intelligence, Iran's nuclear weapons program is being 'vigorously' pursued and its medium and long-range missile development programs are proceeding. North Korea has a well-developed missile program and an estimated one to two nuclear weapons and a capacity to produce more. When these countries can marry weapons with delivery systems, Tehran and Pyongyang can threaten a form of retaliation unavailable to Iraq.¹⁰⁶ India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests seem to suggest the deterrent value of an extant nuclear program. Disarming a state before it develops a deliverable WMD capability is far more attractive than trying to destroy a functioning arsenal.¹⁰⁷ The diplomacy of war is the logical end-game.

It seems highly improbable that Iraq desired to provoke a US-led invasion. It seems more likely that Saddam Hussein sought to exploit divisions in the UN Security Council to draw out the inspection process indefinitely, destroying only those proscribed items that were found and would avert military action. If this was the case, the Iraqi regime overestimated the value

of its 'concessions' and underestimated the resolve of the 'coalition of the willing'. Iran may be motivated by very different calculations of self-interest.

Director of the US House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Yossef Bodansky has suggested that the combination of Iran's urgent pursuit of modernization and its urban youth, who are 'implacably hostile' to the Islamic revolution, have created conditions of instability that have forced the mullahs to conclude that 'not embarking on a war path means social liberalization through economic development and empowerment – and the inevitable demise of clerical rule'.¹⁰⁸ Bodansky continues: 'Tehran is convinced that if the US is permitted to win [the 'war on terrorism'] then political Islam and Iran's strategic aspirations will irrevocably lose'.¹⁰⁹ This determination has taken the form of terrorism sponsorship, regional alliances and the 'irresistible' war against Israel. It is also being expressed in the raising of Iran's nuclear profile, a strategy, encouraged by the North Korean example, that is 'but the first phase in Iran's nuclear brinkmanship doctrine'.¹¹⁰ Bodansky concluded that, for Tehran, 'all available means, from terrorism to sparking a regional war, must be utilized in the desperate struggle to prevent Khomeini's dream-state from withering away'.¹¹¹

North Korea's motives have been difficult to construe but it seems that there is a genuine belief among Administration officials that Pyongyang is playing a high-stakes game of brinkmanship that can be resolved diplomatically. However, the possible resort to military force has been made explicit on occasion. At a meeting with newspaper reporters on 3 March 2003, President Bush explained that US efforts to restraining North Korea's nuclear program were 'in process'. However, he added: 'If they don't work diplomatically, they'll have to work militarily'.¹¹² Three days later, Colin Powell, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, presented the US position in slightly less confrontational but slightly more ambiguous terms: 'The options of sanctions, the option of additional political moves, no military option's been taken off the table, although we have no intention of attacking North Korea as a nation'.¹¹³

The United States has a list of demands that North Korea must satisfy in order to engage in a 'normal' state-to-state relationship with the United States. These are: change its human rights behavior; address the reasons why it appears on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism; eliminate its WMD programs; terminate the proliferation of missile and missile-related technology; and 'adopt a less provocative conventional force disposition'.¹¹⁴ However, it is unclear whether even this will placate an Administration whose Commander-in-Chief reportedly 'loathes' Kim Jong Il.¹¹⁵ Donald Rumsfeld sees North Korea as a proliferation threat rather than as a nuclear threat on the peninsula. 'Unless the world wakes up and says this

is a dangerous thing and creates a set of regimes that will in fact get cooperation to stop those weapons, we're going to be facing a very serious situation in the next five years.'¹¹⁶

Just as in the case of Iraq (and increasingly in the case of Iran), Pyongyang's intentions and behavior regarding its NPT obligations, while a party to the Treaty, have seriously – some would suggest fatally – undermined the global nonproliferation regime. In the assessment of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, the NPT has been 'battered' by North Korea's withdrawal:

The example of new nuclear states that seem able to deter threats from more powerful states, simply by brandishing nuclear weaponry, will resonate deeply among other countries that want to enter the nuclear weapons club. Demand creates the market. The desire for nuclear weapons is on the upsurge. Additional countries may decide to seek nuclear weapons as it becomes clear their neighbors and regional rivals are already doing so. The 'domino theory' of the 21st century may well be nuclear.¹¹⁷

It is precisely this susceptibility to deliberate deception that drives the Bush Administration's deep suspicion, and even hostility, toward multilateral arms control and nonproliferation regimes. Using the BWC to illustrate the point, John Bolton explained that an 'unfortunate' number of the states party to the BWC, including Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya and Cuba, are flatly violating the terms of the Convention. Simply 'piling one convention on top of another is not going to solve the problem' of states prepared to violate the underlined prohibitions. This behavior undercuts the legitimacy and utility of all arms control arrangements.¹¹⁸ Bolton adjudges traditional arms control approaches to have failed in this area and this is why the government is trying to 'think outside the box' and 'encourage other governments to do the same'.¹¹⁹

Conclusion

In 2000, Robert Kagan and William Kristol predicted that Republicans would 'argue that American dominance can be sustained for many decades to come, not by arms control agreements, but by augmenting America's power, and, therefore, its ability to lead'.¹²⁰ The Bush Administration has demonstrated its willingness to enforce the nonproliferation norm when the United Nations can or will not. Whether the past is prologue depends on the lessons Bush and his advisers take from the war in Iraq and how they apply these to other states of proliferation concern.¹²¹ The link between state sponsors of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction has been made.¹²² The inability of multilateral

regimes to arrest proliferation has also been made. The US decision to effect regime change in Iraq has been described as 'long overdue . . . a fundamental, and brave, shift in policy' by one of the war's chief architects.¹²³ Yet the Bush Administration's national security strategy, forged in the crucible of Iraq, undermines the foundations of the nonproliferation regime it professes to be defending.

Current US national security policy is designed to provide Washington with maximum flexibility for unilateral action. As discussed previously, arms control is judged primarily on its ability to facilitate the development and deployment of a new generation of counterforce nuclear weapons and its elasticity to enable a rapid quantitative increase in the nuclear arsenal should circumstances warrant – in much the same way the Reagan Administration countenanced SALT II until 1986 when it finally exceeded the Agreement's limits. While this flexibility may be deemed necessary in the new strategic environment, the trade-off is that such a policy reduces the incentives for other countries to cooperate by demonstrating the importance of precisely those weapons that the nonproliferation regime is trying to de-legitimize.¹²⁴

Preventing proliferation is an international undertaking and the vast majority of nonproliferation tools – export controls, intrusive monitoring regimes, sanctions, threat reduction programs and strengthening international treaties and conventions – require cooperation. But Washington's unilateralist tendency, exhibited most forcefully by its doctrine of pre-emption, will likely sow discord as allies 'conspire more often to frustrate American political objectives',¹²⁵ and enemies like North Korea and Iran, having grasped the fundamental contradiction of the US position, scramble to develop the only weapons that appear to deter a repeat of the Iraq experience. Joseph Nye has observed: 'Multilateralism involves costs, but in the larger picture, they are outweighed by the benefits. International rules bind the United States and limit our freedom of action in the short term, but they also serve our interest by binding others as well.'¹²⁶ By removing even the pretence of being bound itself, Washington cannot expect other nations to submit to, or act in accordance with, the very accords and regimes that it has eschewed. Whether the US will destroy the nonproliferation regime in order to save it, and whether the regime is even worth saving, are questions that the international community must confront. The 'war on terror' has pushed them to centre stage.

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NOTES

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25. It has been estimated that India has produced enough fissile material for 45–95 nuclear warheads but may have assembled only 30–35. 'Global nuclear stockpiles, 1945–2002', *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 58/6 (Nov.–Dec. 2002) p.103.
26. *Proliferation* (note 22) pp.24–25. The CIA's analysis does not include India's chemical and biological weapons programs.
27. *Foreign Missile Developments* (note 24); Federation of American Scientists, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction – Agni', at < www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/agni.htm > (20 April 2003).
28. Federation of American Scientists, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction – Sagarika/Dhanush', at < www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/sagarika.htm > (20 April 2003).
29. It has been estimated that Pakistan has produced enough fissile material for 30–52 nuclear warheads but may have assembled only 24–48. 'Global nuclear stockpiles' (note 25) p.103.
30. *Proliferation* (note 22) p.28. The CIA's analysis of Pakistan does not include chemical and biological weapons programs.
31. Missile ranges are taken from Federation of American Scientists, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction – Pakistan' < www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/ > (20 April 2003). The FAS also reports that Pakistan has imported and tested the 1,500 km range North Korean Nodong missile under the designation 'Ghauri' and may be developing ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 4,000 km.
32. At that time, George H.W. Bush was Director of Central Intelligence, Donald Rumsfeld was Secretary of Defense and Dick Cheney was Chief of Staff.
33. The Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee was established to provide the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy and Under Secretaries for Policy with 'independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of defense policy'. *Charter: Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee*, at < www.odam.osd.mil/omp/pdf/412.pdf > (3 Aug. 2001). Board members include Harold Brown, Newt Gingrich, Henry Kissinger, Dan Quayle, James Schlesinger, George Schultz, Brent Scowcroft and James Woolsey. Former Reagan Administration officials include Kenneth Adelman (ACDA director), Richard Allen (National Security Adviser), Fred Iklé (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) and Henry Rowen (Chairman of the National Intelligence Committee).
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42. Stephen Cambone, 'An Inherent Lesson in Arms Control', *The Washington Quarterly* 23/2 (Spring 2000) p.210.
43. *Ibid.* p.218.
44. Douglas Feith, 'Special Briefing on the Russian Visit', US Department of Defense, News Transcript < www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01162002_t0116fcb.html > (16 Jan. 2002).
45. *Ibid.* This was not completely novel thinking. The first Bush Administration grasped the inability of traditional arms control to meet the exigencies of the post-Cold War environment as evidenced by its decision to withdraw all theatre and tactical nuclear weapons, excluding air-delivered nuclear weapons in Europe, in Sept. 1991. These withdrawals occurred in both Europe and Korea – one of the most senior US officials to the consultations with South Korea on this issue was Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.
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47. *Ibid.* p.3.
48. *Ibid.* p.13.
49. *Ibid.* pp.15–16. Emphasis added.
50. *Ibid.* p.9.
51. *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century*, A Report of the Project for the New American Century, pp.7–8, at < www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf > (Sept. 2000).
52. Under Secretary of State John Bolton, while not contributing directly to the Sept. 2000 report, serves as a director. Other members of The Project for the New American Century include Cheney, Rumsfeld and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman.
53. William Kaufmann, a Pentagon consultant during the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations, disparagingly remarked: 'It strikes me that the whole nuclear crowd was left to their own devices to write this report – the chaps from the weapons labs and the people involved with nuclear strategy – and they all got together and said, "Let's shoot the works. Let's see how much we can get within the wretched constraint of 1,700 warheads."'

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 58. The Office of the President of the United States of America, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Sept. 2002, p.6.
 59. All information is taken from *Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*, at < www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm > (15 July 1998), and 'Remarks of the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld', Center for Security Policy, reprinted in *The Rumsfeld Commission Report*, US Senate, at < <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r105:3:./temp/~r105166tjY:e0> > (14 Oct. 1998).
 60. The Commission stated that the divergence between its findings and the more sanguine Intelligence Community estimates stemmed primarily from its use of a 'more comprehensive methodology', including the realization that missile and WMD programs in proliferation-risk countries no longer follow patterns set by the United States and USSR. This accusation – that the Intelligence Community was 'mirror-imaging', or attributing to other decision-makers behavior that would be expected of their US counterparts in comparable circumstances – was precisely the same charge levelled at the Intelligence Community by the members of 'Team B'; three teams of conservative experts who conducted competitive analyses the CIA's National Intelligence Estimate in the areas of Soviet air defenses, missile accuracy and strategic objectives in 1976. Importantly, Paul Wolfowitz served on 'Team B'. 'Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View Report of Team B' in Donald P. Steury (ed.), *Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces 1950–1983* (Washington DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA 1996) p.366.
 61. The Office of the President of the United States of America, *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Dec. 2002, p.1.
 62. *National Security Strategy* (note 58) p.14.
 63. *National Strategy* (note 3) pp.9–10.
 64. Richard Davis, Director, Office of Strategic Negotiations and Implementation, Bureau of Arms Control, US Department of State, 'Nuclear Offensive Arms Reductions – Past And Present', at < <http://usinfo.state.gov/> > (22 July 2002).
 65. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, *Text of Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty*, Washington, DC, 24 May 2002, Article I.
 66. See Ken Luongo and Ian Davis, 'Bush-Putin Summit Fails to Bury the Cold War', *BASIC Note* 22, at < www.basicint.org/bushputin.htm > (May 2002). Indeed, the US wanted an informal agreement but agreed to make SORT legally binding as a 'concession' to Russia.
 67. See Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 'Russia: Fissile Material Storage Facility', at < www.dtra.mil/ctr/project/projrus/ctr_fissile_storage.html > (24 April 2003); Jon Wolfsthal, Cristina-Astrid Chuen and Emily Ewell Daughtry (eds.), *Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union*, No. 6 (Monterey Institute of International Studies and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2001) pp.60–62.
 68. See comments of General-Colonel Yuriy Baluyevskiy, 1st Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, as reported in Merle Kellerhals Jnr, 'US, Russian Defense Officials Conclude

- Early Arms Talks', *CDI Russia Weekly* #189, at < www.cdi.org/russia/189-8.cfm > (17 Jan. 2002).
69. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, *Text of Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty*, Washington, DC, 24 May 2002.
 70. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President George Bush, 'Missile Defense', Remarks to Students and Faculty at National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, at < www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2001/2873pf.htm > (1 May 2001); Stephen Rademaker, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, 'Remarks by the Representative of the US to the 57th Session of the United Nations First Committee', New York, at < www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/14161pf.htm > (3 Oct. 2003); Powell (note 2).
 71. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 'Announcement of Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty', at < www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.html > (13 Dec. 2001).
 72. Bush, 'Missile Defense' (note 70).
 73. Cambone (note 42) pp.209–10.
 74. John Wolf, 'American Policy: Future Priorities – Reinforcing Efforts to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation' Remarks to Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, Washington DC, at < www.state.gov/t/np/rls/rm/17379pf.htm > (29 Jan. 2003).
 75. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, *A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia* (US Department of Energy, 10 Jan. 2001) pp.iii–iv.
 76. Kenneth Luongo and William Hoehn, 'Threat Reduction: Reform and Revitalization Required', at < www.ransac.org/new-web-site/index.html > (25 March 2003); William Hoehn, 'Impediments to Progress: US Political Support for Nonproliferation Programs', in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council Joint Working Group, *Reshaping US-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade*, 14 Nov. 2002, p.41.
 77. See David Ruppe, 'US-Russia: Nunn, Lugar Say Nuclear Proliferation Should be US Top Priority', *Global Security Newswire*, at < www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2003/3/13/5p.html > (13 March 2003).
 78. Philipp Bleek, 'Threat Reduction Boosted By Policy Review, Spending Bills', at < www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_01-02/tredjanfeb02.asp > (Jan.–Feb. 2002).
 79. William Hoehn, 'Analysis of the Bush Administration's Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Requests for US–Former Soviet Union Nonproliferation Programs', at < www.ransac.org/new-web-site/related/congress/status/fy2003doe_0402.html > (April 2003).
 80. Opening Statement of Chairman Joseph Biden in 'Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes: The Terrorist Nuclear Threat', *Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations Senate*, 107th Congress 2nd Session, Hrg. 107-575, 6 March 2002, p.3.
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 82. All figures are taken from Office of Management and Budget, 'Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004: Department of Energy', at < www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/energy.html > (21 Aug. 2003).
 83. Arms Control Association, 'Briefing Paper on the Status of Biological Weapons Nonproliferation', at < www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwissuebrief.asp > (Sept. 2002); Graham Pearson, Malcolm Dando and Nicholas Sims, *Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference Paper No. 4 – The US Statement at the Fifth Review Conference: Compounding the Error in Rejecting the Composite Protocol* (Bradford, UK: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford), at < www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/RCP_4.pdf > (Jan. 2002).
 84. US Department of State Washington File, 'Transcript – Bolton Briefing on Biological Weapons Pact', at < <http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/2001/1120/epf213.htm> > (19 Nov. 2001).
 85. Kerry Boyd, BWC Review Conference Meets, Avoids Verification Issues', at < www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_12/bwc_dec02.asp > (Dec. 2002); Jonathan B. Tucker and Raymond A. Zlinskas, 'Assessing US Proposals to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention', at < www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_04/tuczilapril02.asp > (April 2002).
 86. 'Expounding Bush's Approach' (note 41).

87. Stephen Hadley, Deputy Assistant to the President, National Security Affairs, Keynote Address to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, at < www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/Conferences%202001/hadley.htm > (18 June 2001). Emphasis in original.
88. Ibid.
89. Richard Haass, *The Reluctant Sheriff* (NY: Council on Foreign Relations 1997).
90. US Department of State, International Information Programs Washington File, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf, 'Nonproliferation Policies and Initiatives', *Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, Washington DC, 19 March 2003.
91. Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly* (Washington, DC: Brookings 2000), p.221; David Halberstam, *War In A Time Of Peace* (NY: Scribner 2001) pp.452, 462, 468–70; and Sidney Blumenthal, *The Clinton Wars* (NY: Viking 2003) p.641.
92. Department of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, Washington DC, at < www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/toc.html > (1997).
93. US Department of State, International Information Programs Washington File, Veterans of Foreign Wars Remarks, *United States Department of Defense Speech By Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz* Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington DC, 11 March 2003.
94. Preventatively striking a nuclear weapons program is not new. In April 1979, 'unidentified' saboteurs destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor core in France, 'only hours before it was due to be shipped to Iraq' and on 7 June 1981, Israeli F-16s, escorted by F-15s, destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor, in Tuwaitah (near Baghdad) before it could become operational. Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb* (NY: Times Books 1981) pp.5–10. Israel's unilateral preventative strike as a superior alternative to an ineffective multilateral arms control regime has been noted approvingly by Richard Perle. See his 'Good guys, bad guys and arms control' in Ian Anthony and Adam Rotfeld (eds.), *SIPRI, A Future Arms Control Agenda* (Oxford: Oxford UP 2001) p.49.
95. US Department of State, International Information Programs, 'Byliner: Under Secretary Bolton on North Korea, Iraq' < <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/bolton.htm> > (13 March 2003). Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly expressed the same sentiment: 'If North Korea gains from its violations, others may conclude that the violation route is cost free. Deterrence would be undermined and our nonproliferation efforts – more critical than ever – would be grossly jeopardized.' US Department of State, International Information Programs, 'Regional Implications of the Changing Nuclear Equation on the Korean Peninsula', Prepared Statement of James Kelly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, 12 March 2003.
96. David E. Sanger, 'Bush's Doctrine for War', at < www.nytimes.com > (18 March 2003).
97. Ibid.
98. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage recently observed that the proliferation challenges of today and tomorrow demand new structures rather than relying on solutions of the past. It was the inability of the system currently in place to deal with nations who move beyond 'certain milestones' in developing WMD that led to the requirement for military intervention in Iraq. US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Richard Armitage, 'Iraq and the Global Challenge of Proliferation', National Defense University, Washington, DC, at < www.usinfo.state.gov > (30 April 2003). I am indebted to Mr Raphael Della Ratta of RANSAC for bringing this speech to my attention.
99. Wolf (note 74). On 19 March 2003, Wolf told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the US was 'determined to do what it takes to push back' the efforts of North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Wolf (note 90).
100. Tim Johnson, 'US views Iran's nuclear program as serious threat', at < www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/5530886.htm > (1 April 2003).
101. REUTERS, 'US Tells Iran, Syria, N. Korea "Learn from Iraq"', at < www.nytimes.com > (9 April 2003).
102. During that speech, Dr El Baradei observed that the nuclear arms control regime was currently being challenged and was clearly under stress. IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, 'Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors', Vienna, at

- < www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n008.shtml > (17 March 2003); Paul Kerr, 'IAEA "Taken Aback" By Speed Of Iran's Nuclear Program', at < www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_04/iran_apr03.asp > (April 2003).
103. Director of Central Intelligence (note 10); Eric Schmitt, '2 US Officers Expect More North Korean "Provocations"', at < www.nytimes.com > (13 March 2003).
 104. 'IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on Safeguards in North Korea', Media Advisory 2003/48, at < www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/P_release/2003/med-advise_048.shtml > (12 Feb. 2003).
 105. The term 'coercive cooperation' – 'to pressure the target ... to adjust internal or external policies' – is taken from Lisa Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton UP 1992) p.4.
 106. The Institute for Science and International Security has assessed that North Korea is likely capable of deploying nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japan. David Albright, *ISIS Issue Brief: North Korea's Current and Future Plutonium and Nuclear Weapon Stocks*, at < www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/currentandfutureweaponsstocks.html > (15 Jan. 2003).
 107. Michael Levi has suggested that in the case of North Korea, military action "though unpalatable, was a genuine alternative" in 1994. The nuclear landscape has changed so dramatically since this time that such a solution is no longer a viable option. Michael Levi, 'Off Target', *The New Republic*, reprinted at < www.fas.org/ssp/docs/030324-newrep.htm > (24 March 2003).
 108. Yossef Bodansky, 'Iran', *What's Next? – Journal of Future Directions International* (Claremont, WA, Australia) March 2003, p.6.
 109. The US presence in Herat only reinforces Tehran's determination to act decisively. Ibid. p.7.
 110. Ibid.
 111. Ibid.
 112. The day after Bush's admission, the Pentagon announced that 24 B-52 and B-1 bombers would be sent to Guam as an insurance policy against North Korean 'opportunism' if military action began in Iraq. David Sanger and Thom Shanker, 'US Sending 2 Dozen Bombers in Easy Range of North Koreans', at < www.nytimes.com > (5 March 2003).
 113. James Dao, 'Bush Administration Defends Its Approach on North Korea', at < www.nytimes.com > (7 Feb. 2003).
 114. Kelly (note 95).
 115. Bob Woodward, *Bush At War* (NY: Simon & Schuster 2002) p.340.
 116. James Dao, 'US Planning Sanctions Against North Korea', at < www.nytimes.com > (17 Feb. 2003).
 117. DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing, 'The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World', at < www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/dci_speech_02112003.html > (11 Feb. 2003).
 118. George Perkovich has argued that the US possession of nuclear weapons, and their centrality to US national security, legitimizes these weapons and makes them attractive to other countries. 'The proliferation threat thus stems from the existence and possession of nuclear weapons and theft-prone materials, not merely from the intentions of today's "axis of evil"'. Perkovich, 'Bush's Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation', *Foreign Affairs* 82/2 (March–April 2003) p.4.
 119. 'Bolton Briefing' (note 84)
 120. Quoted in Jack Mendelsohn, 'Is Arms Control Dead?' *Issues in Science and Technology*, at < www.nap.edu/issues/17.3/mendelsohn/htm > (Spring 2001).
 121. The Administration's focus has already squarely shifted to Syria and Iran. See Eric Schmitt and David Sanger, 'Bush Demands "Cooperation" From Syrians', at < www.nytimes.com > (14 April 2003); 'Colin Powell's Terror Warning', at < www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/31/attack/main546906.shtml > (31 March 2003).
 122. See United States Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002*, at < www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/pdf/ > (April 2003); Director of Central Intelligence, *Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of*

- Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2002*, at < www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_apr_2003.htm > (April 2003).
123. Richard Perle, 'How the United States Can Best Deal with Terrorism', Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Veterans Affairs and International Relations, Washington DC, at < www.aei.org/news/newsID.16489/news_detail.asp > (16 April 2002).
 124. A commission on US national security chaired by Gary Hart and Warren Rudman predicted in Feb. 2001 that America would become 'increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack' and that military superiority would not 'entirely protect' the homeland. The commission counselled that America could not 'secure and advance its own interests in isolation'. *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change*, The Phase III Report of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Washington DC, pp.2, 5, at < www.nssg.gov/PhaseIIIFR.pdf > (15 Feb. 2001).
 125. Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power* (Oxford: Oxford UP 2002), p.35.
 126. *Ibid.* p.158.